“这只是一份工作”

我不愿意矫情，但是这真的就是一份工作而已，不管这份工作的地点是在什么地方，工作多长时间，拿多少薪水，这些事由不得我自己。我和前任老板一共就这个问题谈过两次话，加起来不超过3分钟。
第一次，前任老板说准备派人去，问我有没有兴趣。我回答说有兴趣，但是多长时间？多少钱？老板说：“我也不知道。”OVER.
第二次，前任老板调离原部门的时候，问我啥时候能办完手续，还等着呢？我回答说，还等着呢。老板说：“万一去不了你怎么办？”我说：“我也不知道。”OVER.

说实话，要不是对原来按部就班的日子已经有点腻了，我何必要离开熟悉、喧嚣、精彩的这片热土，去一个陌生、冷清、单调的地方？

“发现别样的生活”

我觉得自己一直都是“老婆孩子热炕头”那种人，简单的生活就能够非常快乐，到现在我的电脑里还有星际、冠军足球经理可见一斑。下了班就急着回家吃饭，一般应酬都不愿去。除非打麻将，周末一般不愿意出街就愿意在家里宅着，特自在惬意。最近才在家里LD的强烈要求下周末去喝个茶，看个电影。也许，我已经上了年纪？
还好，年轻时混过的底子还在。去KTV一般不会有人嫌我唱的难听也就歌老点；去酒吧一般不会有人怪我瞎点啤酒也就芝华士兑绿茶土点；去烧烤一般知道要为人民服务多干少吃也就只会烤肉类俗点。不过，到了新的地方怎么玩？兄弟们要多教教我。先说：别介绍太漂亮的姑娘给我，家里LD是天蝎。

“广大人民群众情绪稳定，各项工作正有序开展。”
上述标签，可以做一个概括。
情绪稳定：“少干活多拿钱，不干活也拿钱”。我认为这代表了我个人职业理想，是一种愿景。但多年来一直如同上足了的发条一样运作，客观上无能也无法实现这样的规划。天赐良机，感谢USCIS，美国移民局在去年底和今年1季度对我的工作许可申请的两次否决。感谢在美律师工作效率的出奇低下，我得以拥有可贵的一段较闲暇的时光。谢谢！
工作有序：最近半年来，我以平均每月350分钟以上的国际长途被中国移动评为最受欢迎客户。可惜我的手机是动感地带预付费套餐，移动方面应该无法获取本人的姓名、住址等详细信息。因此我可能无法获得“中国移动最有价值客户”类似的提名，但我为大幅度提高移动ARPU作出了巨大的贡献，为动感地带品牌客户争取了无上荣光！
因为我必须参加和列席的会议包括：
1. 每月一次，每次3小时的EXECUTIVE MEETING
2. 每月一次，每次1小时的ALCO
3. 每月一次，每次1小时的RISK MANAGMENT COMMITTEE
另外，还可能有：
4. 每月1-2次，每次1小时的CREDIT APPROVAL MEETING
5. 各种各样的工作讨论和项目会议
6. 与同事的八卦讨论等。

根据我6个月来2000多封邮件收件和1000多封发件，以及上述每月超过350分钟的国际长话（不计入接听时间），以上证明“远程办公”完全是可行的。

特别感谢中国移动推出的“12593”IP长话业务，将通讯资费从正常的2.49元/MIN降低到0.39元/MIN，否则，我要么将是中国金融行业内第一个因为手机通讯费过高而破产的小头目，要么将是第一个因为长期不参加办公会议而被开除的小头目。

帮一位北美意图海归的哥们搜工作，结果相当失望：
1.中国最大的招聘网站：ChinaHR.com,搜索条件：
关键字：VP，
职位类别：金融业
行业类别：金融业
其他不限。
结果只有两条：投资副总裁（VP）(04）蓝橡投资顾问（北京）有限公司（蓝橡资本）；和Relationship Manager,Private Banking, China SCB。

关键字改为：director,其他不变
结果只有两条：Associate Director/Director, Energy China Standard Chartered（渣打银行） ，和Executive Assistant to HR Director人力资源助理 国际创奕集团上海分公司
无法满足需求。

2.号称是中国最大的SNS网站，TIANJI.COM，正好我也是会员，
浏览职位-行业选择金融财务-其他不选，搜索结果3页。简单浏览一下，80%是推销保险的，过滤，选择“工作职能”为高级管理：
出来的两个结果：
平安保险重庆部门副总经理
泰康人寿郑州部门业务主管
FT，还是卖保险。

3.行业网站，号称中国最大的金融招聘网站，bankhr.com
关键字：VP
抱歉，没有找到需要的结果。
关键字：VICE PRESIDENT
抱歉，没有找到需要的结果。
关键字：director
3条结果：投行业务项目合伙人（Executive director &... 北京赢思强投资咨询有限公司，投资银行业务-Associate director Hays Executive，Managing director Hays Executive
稍微有点靠谱。

最失望的不是结果少，而是国内的金融行业分类无法让人找到适合自己的职位：
目前北美的主要分类方式是这样的：
美国比较流行的一个金融招聘网站efinancialcareers,金融类SECTOR按照下表分类：

Accounting & Finance	会计和财务
Asset Management	资产管理
Capital Markets	资本市场
Commodities	商品期货
Compliance / Legal	法律合规
Consultancy	咨询
Corporate Banking	公司银行
Credit	信用
Debt / Fixed Income	债和固定收益
Derivatives	衍生产品
Equities	股票交易
FX & Money Markets	外汇和货币市场
Global Custody	全球托管
Graduates & Internships	毕业生和实习
Hedge Funds	对冲基金
HR & Recruitment	人力资源和招聘
Industry & Commerce	工业和商业
Information Services	信息服务
Information Technology	信息技术
Insurance	保险
Investment Banking / M & A	投资银行及收购兼并
Investment Consulting	投资咨询
Investor Relations / PR	投资者关系和公共关系
Operations	运营
Private Banking / Wealth Management	私人银行和财富管理
Private Equity / Venture Capital	私人股权投资和风险投资
Public Sector	其他
Quantitative Analytics	计量分析
Real Estate	房地产
Research	研究
Retail Banking	零售银行
Risk Management	风险管理
Sales & Marketing	销售和营销
Trading	交易

一目了然，包括了所有金融类行业的主要工作类别，点击进去即可查询详细的职位状态。
再看看国内网站使用的分类方式,仍然以BANKHR.COM为例，职位类别如下：
高管/运营类   
银行/财政金融类   
证券/外汇/期货类
投资/融资/担保/理财类   
风险/基金类   
顾问/咨询类
项目管理类   
财务/审计/税务   
保险类
金融翻译/法律类   
金融/经济研究分析/金融IT类   
市场营销/销售类
行政人事类

请问，一个在外资银行固定收益小组做QUANT的Senior Analyst,如果在BANKHR网站上的分类算是什么岗位？一个经验丰富的OPTION VOL TRADER，在香港做到HEAD OF DERIVATIVES,想要找一个国内衍生产品团队领导的职位，应该归入高管还是投资？一个做贸易融资的高级经理或者DIRECTOR，应该在什么条目下搜索岗位？

岗位分类和国际金融界不能对接只是一个问题，另一个问题是垃圾职位太多，而高级职位太少。这个就不展开了，总之，你不能让保险推销和美股日内证券交易这样的炮灰职位和首席风险官、职业精算师混在一个栏目里面吧。

原文链接：http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/opinion/25desantis.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&th&emc=th
summary:
3月24日，纽约时报全文刊登了Jake DeSantis,一名AIG集团金融产品部门股票和商品期货执行副总裁，写给AIG集团CEO，Edward M. Liddy的辞职信。
Jake在信中提到，他1998年从MIT毕业以来，一直为AIG服务了11年。从一名股票交易员做起，直至担任股票和商品期货交易台主管。在这些年的工作中，他和他的同事勤勤恳恳，每天工作12-14个小时，每年为公司赚取数以亿计美元的利润。作为AIG集团核心部门的中层领导人之一，在2008年信用危机爆发后，Jake同意在年薪1美元的情况下继续工作，以示对公司的支持和忠诚，当然，另一方面，在过去的12月以来，公司的高层一直鼓励金融产品部门的精英努力工作，并承诺会按照合约在09年3月份支付奖金。
Jake认为，AIG高层在3月13日批准发放奖金以后，又要求职员们退回奖金的做法是非常荒谬的。他和大多数在金融产品部门工作的其他同事一样，并不应该为把AIG集团拖入泥潭的信用掉期债券交易负责，他们从事的工作业绩出色，毫无理由因此受到惩罚。只是由于AIG管理层承受了来自国会议员、政府官员、社会舆论的广泛压力以后，自食其言。这样的立场不坚定让人无法理解。因此JAKE提出辞呈，并表示拒绝退回奖金，但要将所获得的所有奖金742006.40美元(税后）捐献给收到金融危机影响的金融机构，自己分文不取。

以下引用两段邮件中非常到位的描述：
“As most of us have done nothing wrong, guilt is not a motivation to surrender our earnings. We have worked 12 long months under these contracts and now deserve to be paid as promised. None of us should be cheated of our payments any more than a plumber should be cheated after he has fixed the pipes but a careless electrician causes a fire that burns down the house.

Many of the employees have, in the past six months, turned down job offers from more stable employers, based on A.I.G.’s assurances that the contracts would be honored. They are now angry about having been misled by A.I.G.’s promises and are not inclined to return the money as a favor to you.The only real motivation that anyone at A.I.G.-F.P. now has is fear. Mr. Cuomo has threatened to “name and shame,” and his counterpart in Connecticut, Richard Blumenthal, has made similar threats — even though attorneys general are supposed to stand for due process, to conduct trials in courts and not the press.”

注意这句："None of us should be cheated of our payments any more than a plumber should be cheated after he has fixed the pipes but a careless electrician causes a fire that burns down the house."
我们中的任何人的薪水都不应该被夺走，就像一个水管工在修好了水管以后发现，由于电工的粗心大意，房子被大火烧跨，造成水管工应得的报酬也拿不到。

美国人的表述，形象到位。在金融产品部门中，从事CDS的可能只有3，5个人，而股票、外汇、商品和能源、债券、期权这些交易人员怎么会知道，自己这边辛辛苦苦赚到的利润，都被这3、5同事在几个月，几周，甚至几天之内就挥霍一空了呢？显然这不是他们的错，后果不应当由这些人承担。同时我们也应该认识到，AIG要求员工退还奖金的做法违反了基本的信用，这不是一个好的做法。美国的国会议员们，这不是一个符合“American spirit"的案例。我们其实因此有理由怀疑，美国佬对其他事情的诚信，比如你购买了AIG发行的债券，他们会不会在你快拿到利息的时候告诉你，对不起，现在国会压力太大，我们不能付你钱了。这真的有可能发生。

当然，trader的激励机制在全世界都是大问题。以前我们在中资，非常羡慕外资的朋友们可以在底薪之外，根据自己个人的业绩拿到一笔数倍于底薪的奖金。但是，金融危机以后，我们也看到“皮之不存，毛将焉附”的风险。以前欧美方式的激励还是存在重大的缺陷，总结有三点：
1.正向激励太多，而风险约束不够：交易员为了拿到更高的奖金会有动力去冒更大的风险，一旦出了问题，损失不是个人承担，而是整个组织，甚至于全社会承担。位置越高的人，越希望去冒险。
2.个人英雄主义太多，而团队合作不够：交易行大行其道，衍生产品层出不穷的欧美30年金融发展史，就是明星交易员们创造的历史。长期资本管理公司，所罗门，高盛，富达，文艺复兴基金，其背后都是1个或1群传奇人物。但是我们知道，英雄往往是悲剧结局，我们还知道,一将功成万骨枯。那么我们是需要英雄，还是需要机制？我们应该建立一种制度，既要保护英雄，也要保护普通的从业者，投资者。
3.防火墙制度和信托权限。我们不能再让一个里森拖垮整个巴林银行的事件重演。水管工修水管的时候，电工就算要烧房子，也只能烧他在的那一间房，甚至于只能让他烧掉他自己手上的电线。我们不能让几个人组成的CDS tradind desk持有超过公司全部资本的信用违约掉期合约敞口，我们不能让刘其兵一个“临时工”处长就可以决定卖掉比市场存量还多一倍的铜期货合约，我们不能让陈久霖一个人就拍板处理所有航空煤油sell put option，我们不能让中信泰富、深南电财务部的几个人就跑去和臭名昭著的“狗剩”签对赌货币累进期权协议。我们要告诉普通的老百姓、企业主，金融市场有很多很多猫腻，不是你们玩得起玩的转的，我们还要告诉政府官员、经济专家，你们位高权重，但不见得全知全能。德意志银行2003年的时候，全球有400个trader，全中国到现在一共也找不到400个能做独立判断、熟悉金融市场、知晓定价规则的trader。

Michael Lewis & David Einhorn， New York times 3 Jan.

作者介绍：

Michael Lewis 是Liar’s Poker的作者

David Einhorn 是Greenlight Capital的主席

翻译by Barry Liu 原文附后

“金融白痴”，进入新的一年，美国人获得了一个新的称号。虽然在其他方面，我们被整个世界广泛地怀疑不信任，但是在关于金钱的这方面，即便是最严苛的评论者都曾经相信我们知道我们在做什么。他们曾尝试观察和学习我们的投资银行家们，在很长的一段时间以来，有半个世界的大学毕业生都把在华尔街工作当作他们的最佳的选择。

这也是当我们的金融体系突然崩溃时，不仅仅是美国，而几乎是全球都出现了广泛的信心危机的一个原因。上帝啊，整个世界都在惊呼，如果美国人都不知道对于金钱如何处理，那么谁会知道？

令人难以置信的是，世界各地的聪明人们仍然愿意借给我们钱，甚至听我们的意见，他们似乎没有充分意识到我们的疯狂程度。我们至少有机会治愈自己。但首先我们要问：治什么？

为了讨论这个问题，我们来看看一个关于Harry Markopolos先生的一个奇怪的故事。Harry Markopolos先生，他曾经在波士顿的Rampart投资管理公司担任投资经理，9年来，他一直向美国证监会投诉伯纳德.麦道夫涉嫌欺诈。Harry认为根据麦道夫所陈述的投资策略，他的投资表现不太可能真实成立，从数学计算看来是不可能达到的，除非麦道夫做了一些他没有讲出来的事情。

在Harry向证监会提供的一份17页的有说服力的信件中，他陈述了两种情景：在一种不太可能成立的情景中，麦道夫既扮演交易经纪人也扮演投资者，这样他就可能存在“老鼠仓”行为——举例说明，当客户向麦道夫证券公司下指令在一定价格水平下购买IBM公司股票的时候，麦道夫证券公司首先在其自营的账户中购买IBM股票，如果IBM公司股票如期上涨，那么麦道夫证券公司就保留股票获利，如果股价下跌，那么他就把股票扔给客户。

Harry描述的另外一种更有可能的情况是：麦道夫证券公司是世界上最大的“旁氏骗局”（Ponzi scheme一种金字塔式的传销骗局），关于这个词，如今我们已经都知道了。

在2005年11月7日，即如今麦道夫骗局被广泛披露的三年前，Harry Markopolos就向美国证监会提供了这份报告，但实际上从1999年开始，Harry就尝试向证监会举报这一欺诈行为。Harry在举发麦道夫骗局中并没有直接的经济利益，他既不是麦道夫的客户也不是其雇员，也不可能通过卖空麦道夫证券公司股票来获益，因此Harry不会通过搞垮麦道夫获得一分钱。从投诉的信件这种可以看出，因为害怕有人会因为这份报告对他和他的家人不利，Harry表现的非常低调，甚至没有在报告上署名。但是证监会草率的调查让麦道夫反而更加肆无忌惮地去欺诈。

回顾麦道夫丑闻给我们带来的启示，有意思的是，在金融圈子内没什么人对揭发麦道夫有兴趣。并不是只有Harry Markopolos嗅出了麦道夫的狐狸尾巴，正如他在揭发信中陈述的那样，高盛公司曾经拒绝与麦道夫打交道；也有很多人质疑过麦道夫的盈利或者想像过麦道夫会利用老鼠仓的行为损害客户肥了自己。在报告的字里行间，Markopolos先生暗示有一些麦道夫的客户虽然已经开始怀疑麦道夫，说真的，其实并不难看出怎么可能存在如此巨大的盈利空间呢？但是投资者认为无论如何他们从这个骗局中获益了，他们能设想到的最坏的可能性不过是，一旦有关当局停止麦道夫的老鼠仓行为，他们的一次“好投资”就此了结，如此而已。

麦道夫丑闻反映了存在于我们金融体系中的一些深层次的缺陷，金融体系不仅仅被一些不好的行为所侵蚀，更重要的是，我们缺乏各监管机构间的制衡和合作去阻止这样的行为。“贪婪”并不是对于目前金融危机爆发的理想的解释，不错，我们需要贪婪，但不仅仅需要贪婪。在某种情况下，我们的国民性中可能避免贪婪，正如我们的也同样有欲望和嫉妒的要求，但其实也能避免他们。问题的复杂性就在于并不是少数人的贪婪而是人民大众的被误导的利益。

我们已经说过和写过太多，例如，那些产生了不道德影响的华尔街巨额奖金。正如那些在华尔街主流公司里发生过的事，上市公司的领导人，特别是金融企业的领导人，他们对短期的业绩更加看重，在混乱中要求巨额的支票以满足他们的贪欲。

理查德福尔德，雷曼兄弟的前行政长官；斯坦利奥尼尔，美林证券的前行政长官；和查尔斯普林斯，花旗集团的首席执行官，他们在每年底都支付给自己巨大的财富，作为债券市场盈利的奖金。但如果他们中的其中一位把自己作为举报人的角色，站起来说：“这是一家不负责任的公司，我们不会参与进去的。”他很有可能早就被解雇了，可能不会是立即解雇。只要有几个季度的业绩不如其他公司，他们就会受到来自下属的愤怒和离职的威胁，也有来自不负责任公司、股东的批评，要求其辞职。最终，他们会被其他的愿意从信贷泡沫中赚钱的人所替代。

我 们的金融灾难，好似麦道夫的传销，需要各种层面上重要的关键性的人以牺牲长远的集体利益而换取短期收益为目的，才能达成。在如今的金融市场上做到这一点的压力是巨大的。显然，市场给予短期回报的压力越巨大，我们就越需要有人在市场外考虑长远的利益。但是问题就在于此：已经没有人从市场以外给予经营者长远利益的压力了。追求短期回报的暴政的威胁下，原本一些试图让华尔街变得有序，而且考虑去追求有远见的自我实现的公司企业也轻易地改变了立场。

 

再举例说明，信用评级中介。

 

每个人都知道穆迪和标准普尔已经修订了他们对于房屋抵押贷款债券的分析。但是比他们现在已经遭受的批评严重地多也更令人注意的问题在于，他们在他们最擅长的领域——为公司信用评级——方面说谎。

 

在过去20年中，随着监管机构的鼓励，也在评级机构（顺便说一句，评级机构是从债券发行人获取报酬的）不置一词的默许下，美国的金融机构承担了越来越多的风险。穆迪或标准普尔从来不会对金融机构说：“如果你们的资产负债表上面再多一点风险资产，我们就给你降级。”

 

AIG、Fannie Mae、Freddie Mac、GE还有市政债券担保者Ambac Financial以及MBIA，统统是AAA级别（GE到现在还是！）。大的投资银行比如雷曼和美林，都是稳固的投资级别。这似乎是说明金融机构的信用评级越高，对金融危机的贡献程度就越大。当然，这样的大型机构在创造更多的信用产品的同时，也为穆迪和标准普尔创造了更多的收入。

 

这些垄断的寡头们——这实际上是美国证券交易委员会认可的——不只是没有做好自己的工作，他们不仅仅是错过了几个电话，为了追求他们自身的短期收益，他们除了暴露出来的系统性的金融风险，而且还做了原本人们以为他们不会做的所有事情。

 

这也是将在华盛顿谈论的一个非常有价值的话题，有胆量的参议员可能会问信用评级中介很多问题。其中一个问题是：为什么你们会允许MBIA保持AAA评级那么长时间？1990年，MBIA开始为发行市政债券进行担保，他拥有9.31亿美元的股票但仅有2亿元的债权，这些债券似乎都拥有AAA的评级。到了2006年，MBIA已经进入更高风险的业务，比如为抵押债权协议 (CDO) 提供担保。但到那时，他有72亿的股票，可是债券资产已经扩大到令人惊讶的262亿美元。这样，由于为风险更大的业务进行担保，他自身的资产负债表上也有了更大的风险。

然而，评级机构没有如此反应。在华尔街上有一个问题几乎不是秘密，很多人都知道MBIA不应该获得AAA评级。早在2002年，一家叫Gotham partners的对冲基金就出版了一份报告，名称就叫“MBIA是AAA吗？”（答案当然是否定的）。

但同时，几乎所有的投资者都相信评级机构不会对MBIA降级，因为那样做和评级机构的短期利益不符。如果对MBIA降级，会迫使评级机构启动他们那些成本高昂的繁琐的重新评级程序，去评价有MBIA担保的数以万计的信用担保债券，这些债券都是AAA评级。评级机构会觉得那样会非常痛苦。（到了08年6月，在MBIA破产后，评级机构最终下调了MBIA的信用评级，不过在此之前已经没有人在乎官方给出的信用评级了。）

美国证监会现在承诺会审慎地评估评级机构带来的损害，评估这个没有解决的核心问题：定价人是由发行人支付报酬的。但是这不应该感到惊奇，因为证监会本身也处于相似的情形。事实上，麦道夫丑闻的巨大社会贡献之一就是揭示出美国证监会是怎样的一回事的。

在金融掠食者前保护弱小的投资者，这本来是证监会的天职。但如今已经在某种意义上变成了利用政治影响力保护掠食者的一种机制（这一任务在这次危机中表现得最淋漓尽致的地方就在于对卖空者的威吓和课税惩罚规则，本来卖空者是市场上最有积极性去揭露欺诈和恶习的参与者。）

本能的避免短期的政治热点是问题的一个方面，证监会做的所有事都是在搅浑市场，或是为降低公司的股价，也搅浑了证监会操作者个人的职业生涯。因为它很少对一系列公司和管理层的渎职行为进行惩处，一些渎职行为已经严重地影响了股价，股东利益受到了影响，信心也遭受重创。即便是在对市场报有错误的信心的情况下，保持市场信心仍然在证监会的首要日程表上。不难看出证监会为什么会这么做，如果你为证监会的执行部门工作，你会思前想后，然后选择与华尔街巨头保持良好关系，以便日后一旦你受雇于他们的时候获得丰厚的回报。

看，证监会执行部门最近一位的处长现在是JP MORGAN CHASE的总法律代表，在他之前的证券会执行部门的首席成为了德意志银行的总法律代表；他的其中一位前任在跳槽去MORGAN STANLEY之前出任了瑞士信贷的董事总经理。如果你不留意的话，你根本就观察不到在证监会执行部门成为一个处长是将来获得华尔街高薪职位的捷径。

让我们回到Harry Markopolos勇敢的报告中来，他在2008年4月2日写给Jonathan S. Sokobin的一份电子邮件如今到处流传。 Mr.Sokobin先生届时刚刚成为证监会风险评估部门的负责人，这个职位已经超过1年没有人问津了，你们可以猜到，其前任去了华尔街挣大钱。Markopolos希望一个新面孔能听得进他的说话，他认为Sokobin可能会认为他说的话是真的，于是他打电话给Sokobin并随后发给他举报信。“附件是我在波士顿向证监会提供了三次的证据，每次波士顿证监会都会把这份材料送到纽约，交给Meagan Cheung，纽约分部的领导，然后在纽约调查。但是据我所知每次都没有结果。通过跟她谈话，我不认为她拥有衍生产品和数学知识去了解这些犯罪行为。”Harry 在电话里向Sokobin投诉说道。

为什么会这样？一个负责监管华尔街的人却不知如何去使用工具了解这些公司在做什么？难道证监会竟然如此无能？可能吧，但是在证监会内部存在的问题更加严重，无能的人可以被替换，因此证监会的问题是制度性的。新任的风险评估部负责人和其前任一样不太可能看到麦道夫骗局的风险，因为他们的想法是出于同一个动机：拍大人物的马屁以换取华尔街精英的欢心。

于是最令人难以置信的事发生了，现代史上最宏大的人造金融危机在长达18个月时间内发生了，无人可改变，也没有任何不良因素导致我们自食其果。

你能对我们政府如何拯救金融危机说什么？你不能指控政府浪费了大量的精力去为获得一致的意见或者是去争取大多数人同意。在过去的1年中，至少有7中不同的解困方法和6中策略被提出，可是除了一些银行家外，没有一个能获得所有人的支持。当贝尔斯登破产时，政府以承诺以较低的价格回购贝尔斯登的问题资产来诱惑JP MORGAN CHASE买下贝尔斯登。贝尔斯登的债券持有人会得到保护，但股票持有者损失殆尽。

接下来，政府事业单位也轰然倒下，Fannie Mae和Freddie Mac迅速地国有化，更换了管理层，股东损失惨重，债权人虽然无损但前途未知。接下来是雷曼兄弟，当然他被允许破产了。刚开始，财政部和联储声明他们袖手雷曼破产是为了表明，那些横冲直撞的华尔街公司并没有获得政府救助的承诺。但是随着恐慌发生，人们开始批评政府坐视雷曼倒下是最愚蠢的事情，政府又改变了他们的说法，认为政府缺乏法律依据去救助这样的公司。几天后，AIG出现问题。政府为AIG提供了巨大的贷款支持。华盛顿互换银行和瓦乔比亚（美联银行）也接踵而至，前者被财政部接管后来交给CHASE，后者开始与花旗集团谈判，准备采用贝尔斯登模式，后来被富国银行收购。

在这一过程中，财长保尔森在国会作证并试图说服国会提供给财政部7000亿美元去收购银行的问题资产。他对参议员和代表说如果他们不提供资金的话，股票市场会倒掉。但当他拿到资金后，他违背了按照市价收购资产的承诺，开始高价购买银行发行的优先股权，有说法他已经向花旗银行，MORGAN STANLEY , GOLDMAN SACHS及其他银行违规地提供支持，而不是通过优胜劣汰的选择。股票市场更加下跌了。

即便是不向大众解释的话，我们不知道保尔森先生如何说服他自己。但是常识告诉我们，如果你向银行提供资本，他们会用来贷款以刺激经济。如果你希望银行家能够审慎和聪明的放贷的话，你就不应该把钱借给那些曾经做过不明智投资的人。如果你希望银行可以重新放贷的话，你不应该要购买他们的优先股，而是去购买银行的普通股权。这样银行可以将资产负债表上的损失剥离，还是重新投入放贷。但是如果购买了优先股的话，银行拿到了纳税人的钱却没有任何行动。

 

 

AMERICANS enter the New Year in a strange new role: financial lunatics. We’ve been viewed by the wider world with mistrust and suspicion on other matters, but on the subject of money even our harshest critics have been inclined to believe that we knew what we were doing. They watched our investment bankers and emulated them: for a long time now half the planet’s college graduates seemed to want nothing more out of life than a job on Wall Street.

This is one reason the collapse of our financial system has inspired not merely a national but a global crisis of confidence. Good God, the world seems to be saying, if they don’t know what they are doing with money, who does?

Incredibly, intelligent people the world over remain willing to lend us money and even listen to our advice; they appear not to have realized the full extent of our madness. We have at least a brief chance to cure ourselves. But first we need to ask: of what?

To that end consider the strange story of Harry Markopolos. Mr. Markopolos is the former investment officer with Rampart Investment Management in Boston who, for nine years, tried to explain to the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bernard L. Madoff couldn’t be anything other than a fraud. Mr. Madoff’s investment performance, given his stated strategy, was not merely improbable but mathematically impossible. And so, Mr. Markopolos reasoned, Bernard Madoff must be doing something other than what he said he was doing.

In his devastatingly persuasive 17-page letter to the S.E.C., Mr. Markopolos saw two possible scenarios. In the “Unlikely” scenario: Mr. Madoff, who acted as a broker as well as an investor, was “front-running” his brokerage customers. A customer might submit an order to Madoff Securities to buy shares in I.B.M. at a certain price, for example, and Madoff Securities instantly would buy I.B.M. shares for its own portfolio ahead of the customer order. If I.B.M.’s shares rose, Mr. Madoff kept them; if they fell he fobbed them off onto the poor customer.

In the “Highly Likely” scenario, wrote Mr. Markopolos, “Madoff Securities is the world’s largest Ponzi Scheme.” Which, as we now know, it was.

Harry Markopolos sent his report to the S.E.C. on Nov. 7, 2005 — more than three years before Mr. Madoff was finally exposed — but he had been trying to explain the fraud to them since 1999. He had no direct financial interest in exposing Mr. Madoff — he wasn’t an unhappy investor or a disgruntled employee. There was no way to short shares in Madoff Securities, and so Mr. Markopolos could not have made money directly from Mr. Madoff’s failure. To judge from his letter, Harry Markopolos anticipated mainly downsides for himself: he declined to put his name on it for fear of what might happen to him and his family if anyone found out he had written it. And yet the S.E.C.’s cursory investigation of Mr. Madoff pronounced him free of fraud.

What’s interesting about the Madoff scandal, in retrospect, is how little interest anyone inside the financial system had in exposing it. It wasn’t just Harry Markopolos who smelled a rat. As Mr. Markopolos explained in his letter, Goldman Sachs was refusing to do business with Mr. Madoff; many others doubted Mr. Madoff’s profits or assumed he was front-running his customers and steered clear of him. Between the lines, Mr. Markopolos hinted that even some of Mr. Madoff’s investors may have suspected that they were the beneficiaries of a scam. After all, it wasn’t all that hard to see that the profits were too good to be true. Some of Mr. Madoff’s investors may have reasoned that the worst that could happen to them, if the authorities put a stop to the front-running, was that a good thing would come to an end.

The Madoff scandal echoes a deeper absence inside our financial system, which has been undermined not merely by bad behavior but by the lack of checks and balances to discourage it. “Greed” doesn’t cut it as a satisfying explanation for the current financial crisis. Greed was necessary but insufficient; in any case, we are as likely to eliminate greed from our national character as we are lust and envy. The fixable problem isn’t the greed of the few but the misaligned interests of the many.

A lot has been said and written, for instance, about the corrupting effects on Wall Street of gigantic bonuses. What happened inside the major Wall Street firms, though, was more deeply unsettling than greedy people lusting for big checks: leaders of public corporations, especially financial corporations, are as good as required to lead for the short term.

Richard Fuld, the former chief executive of Lehman Brothers, E. Stanley O’Neal, the former chief executive of Merrill Lynch, and Charles O. Prince III, Citigroup’s chief executive, may have paid themselves humongous sums of money at the end of each year, as a result of the bond market bonanza. But if any one of them had set himself up as a whistleblower — had stood up and said “this business is irresponsible and we are not going to participate in it” — he would probably have been fired. Not immediately, perhaps. But a few quarters of earnings that lagged behind those of every other Wall Street firm would invite outrage from subordinates, who would flee for other, less responsible firms, and from shareholders, who would call for his resignation. Eventually he’d be replaced by someone willing to make money from the credit bubble.

OUR financial catastrophe, like Bernard Madoff’s pyramid scheme, required all sorts of important, plugged-in people to sacrifice our collective long-term interests for short-term gain. The pressure to do this in today’s financial markets is immense. Obviously the greater the market pressure to excel in the short term, the greater the need for pressure from outside the market to consider the longer term. But that’s the problem: there is no longer any serious pressure from outside the market. The tyranny of the short term has extended itself with frightening ease into the entities that were meant to, one way or another, discipline Wall Street, and force it to consider its enlightened self-interest.

The credit-rating agencies, for instance.

Everyone now knows that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s botched their analyses of bonds backed by home mortgages. But their most costly mistake — one that deserves a lot more attention than it has received — lies in their area of putative expertise: measuring corporate risk.

Over the last 20 years American financial institutions have taken on more and more risk, with the blessing of regulators, with hardly a word from the rating agencies, which, incidentally, are paid by the issuers of the bonds they rate. Seldom if ever did Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s say, “If you put one more risky asset on your balance sheet, you will face a serious downgrade.”

The American International Group, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, General Electric and the municipal bond guarantors Ambac Financial and MBIA all had triple-A ratings. (G.E. still does!) Large investment banks like Lehman and Merrill Lynch all had solid investment grade ratings. It’s almost as if the higher the rating of a financial institution, the more likely it was to contribute to financial catastrophe. But of course all these big financial companies fueled the creation of the credit products that in turn fueled the revenues of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.

These oligopolies, which are actually sanctioned by the S.E.C., didn’t merely do their jobs badly. They didn’t simply miss a few calls here and there. In pursuit of their own short-term earnings, they did exactly the opposite of what they were meant to do: rather than expose financial risk they systematically disguised it.

This is a subject that might be profitably explored in Washington. There are many questions an enterprising United States senator might want to ask the credit-rating agencies. Here is one: Why did you allow MBIA to keep its triple-A rating for so long? In 1990 MBIA was in the relatively simple business of insuring municipal bonds. It had $931 million in equity and only $200 million of debt — and a plausible triple-A rating.

By 2006 MBIA had plunged into the much riskier business of guaranteeing collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s. But by then it had $7.2 billion in equity against an astounding $26.2 billion in debt. That is, even as it insured ever-greater risks in its business, it also took greater risks on its balance sheet.

Yet the rating agencies didn’t so much as blink. On Wall Street the problem was hardly a secret: many people understood that MBIA didn’t deserve to be rated triple-A. As far back as 2002, a hedge fund called Gotham Partners published a persuasive report, widely circulated, entitled: “Is MBIA Triple A?” (The answer was obviously no.)

At the same time, almost everyone believed that the rating agencies would never downgrade MBIA, because doing so was not in their short-term financial interest. A downgrade of MBIA would force the rating agencies to go through the costly and cumbersome process of re-rating tens of thousands of credits that bore triple-A ratings simply by virtue of MBIA’s guarantee. It would stick a wrench in the machine that enriched them. (In June, finally, the rating agencies downgraded MBIA, after MBIA’s failure became such an open secret that nobody any longer cared about its formal credit rating.)

The S.E.C. now promises modest new measures to contain the damage that the rating agencies can do — measures that fail to address the central problem: that the raters are paid by the issuers.

But this should come as no surprise, for the S.E.C. itself is plagued by similarly wacky incentives. Indeed, one of the great social benefits of the Madoff scandal may be to finally reveal the S.E.C. for what it has become.

Created to protect investors from financial predators, the commission has somehow evolved into a mechanism for protecting financial predators with political clout from investors. (The task it has performed most diligently during this crisis has been to question, intimidate and impose rules on short-sellers — the only market players who have a financial incentive to expose fraud and abuse.)

The instinct to avoid short-term political heat is part of the problem; anything the S.E.C. does to roil the markets, or reduce the share price of any given company, also roils the careers of the people who run the S.E.C. Thus it seldom penalizes serious corporate and management malfeasance — out of some misguided notion that to do so would cause stock prices to fall, shareholders to suffer and confidence to be undermined. Preserving confidence, even when that confidence is false, has been near the top of the S.E.C.’s agenda.

IT’S not hard to see why the S.E.C. behaves as it does. If you work for the enforcement division of the S.E.C. you probably know in the back of your mind, and in the front too, that if you maintain good relations with Wall Street you might soon be paid huge sums of money to be employed by it.

The commission’s most recent director of enforcement is the general counsel at JPMorgan Chase; the enforcement chief before him became general counsel at Deutsche Bank; and one of his predecessors became a managing director for Credit Suisse before moving on to Morgan Stanley. A casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that the whole point of landing the job as the S.E.C.’s director of enforcement is to position oneself for the better paying one on Wall Street.

At the back of the version of Harry Markopolos’s brave paper currently making the rounds is a copy of an e-mail message, dated April 2, 2008, from Mr. Markopolos to Jonathan S. Sokobin. Mr. Sokobin was then the new head of the commission’s office of risk assessment, a job that had been vacant for more than a year after its previous occupant had left to — you guessed it — take a higher-paying job on Wall Street.

At any rate, Mr. Markopolos clearly hoped that a new face might mean a new ear — one that might be receptive to the truth. He phoned Mr. Sokobin and then sent him his paper. “Attached is a submission I’ve made to the S.E.C. three times in Boston,” he wrote. “Each time Boston sent this to New York. Meagan Cheung, branch chief, in New York actually investigated this but with no result that I am aware of. In my conversations with her, I did not believe that she had the derivatives or mathematical background to understand the violations.”

How does this happen? How can the person in charge of assessing Wall Street firms not have the tools to understand them? Is the S.E.C. that inept? Perhaps, but the problem inside the commission is far worse — because inept people can be replaced. The problem is systemic. The new director of risk assessment was no more likely to grasp the risk of Bernard Madoff than the old director of risk assessment because the new guy’s thoughts and beliefs were guided by the same incentives: the need to curry favor with the politically influential and the desire to keep sweet the Wall Street elite.

And here’s the most incredible thing of all: 18 months into the most spectacular man-made financial calamity in modern experience, nothing has been done to change that, or any of the other bad incentives that led us here in the first place.

SAY what you will about our government’s approach to the financial crisis, you cannot accuse it of wasting its energy being consistent or trying to win over the masses. In the past year there have been at least seven different bailouts, and six different strategies. And none of them seem to have pleased anyone except a handful of financiers.

When Bear Stearns failed, the government induced JPMorgan Chase to buy it by offering a knockdown price and guaranteeing Bear Stearns’s shakiest assets. Bear Stearns bondholders were made whole and its stockholders lost most of their money.

Then came the collapse of the government-sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both promptly nationalized. Management was replaced, shareholders badly diluted, creditors left intact but with some uncertainty. Next came Lehman Brothers, which was, of course, allowed to go bankrupt. At first, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve claimed they had allowed Lehman to fail in order to signal that recklessly managed Wall Street firms did not all come with government guarantees; but then, when chaos ensued, and people started saying that letting Lehman fail was a dumb thing to have done, they changed their story and claimed they lacked the legal authority to rescue the firm.

But then a few days later A.I.G. failed, or tried to, yet was given the gift of life with enormous government loans. Washington Mutual and Wachovia promptly followed: the first was unceremoniously seized by the Treasury, wiping out both its creditors and shareholders; the second was batted around for a bit. Initially, the Treasury tried to persuade Citigroup to buy it — again at a knockdown price and with a guarantee of the bad assets. (The Bear Stearns model.) Eventually, Wachovia went to Wells Fargo, after the Internal Revenue Service jumped in and sweetened the pot with a tax subsidy.

In the middle of all this, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. persuaded Congress that he needed $700 billion to buy distressed assets from banks — telling the senators and representatives that if they didn’t give him the money the stock market would collapse. Once handed the money, he abandoned his promised strategy, and instead of buying assets at market prices, began to overpay for preferred stocks in the banks themselves. Which is to say that he essentially began giving away billions of dollars to Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and a few others unnaturally selected for survival. The stock market fell anyway.

It’s hard to know what Mr. Paulson was thinking as he never really had to explain himself, at least not in public. But the general idea appears to be that if you give the banks capital they will in turn use it to make loans in order to stimulate the economy. Never mind that if you want banks to make smart, prudent loans, you probably shouldn’t give money to bankers who sunk themselves by making a lot of stupid, imprudent ones. If you want banks to re-lend the money, you need to provide them not with preferred stock, which is essentially a loan, but with tangible common equity — so that they might write off their losses, resolve their troubled assets and then begin to make new loans, something they won’t be able to do until they’re confident in their own balance sheets. But as it happened, the banks took the taxpayer money and just sat on it.